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The relationship between collaboration with competitors and goods innovation performance was
investigated along with the moderating effect of the innovating firm’s technological capability. The
hypothesis that collaboration with competitors has an inverted U-shaped relationship with goods
innovation performance was tested using data on new goods introductions from 749 Iranian firms.
The results support the balance between competition and collaboration by confirming that collaboration with competitors contributes considerably to successful goods innovation. The positive
influences of co-optation certainly seem consistent with the cooperative arguments that collaboration with competitors increases absorptive capacity, improves information exchange and facilitates joint problem solving. The results also show that unnecessary collaboration with competitors
can have a negative influence on innovation performance, raising concerns about opportunistic
exploitation. The results support the existence of a bell-shaped relationship between co-opetition
and goods innovation performance. Technological capability and alliances with universities were
shown to weaken the relationship.

Abstract

Keywords: co-opetition, technological capabilities, R&D collaboration, goods innovation, emerging
market
Hubungan antara kolaborasi dengan pesaing dan kinerja inovasi barang diinvestigasi bersamaan
dengan efek moderasi kapabilitas inovasi teknologi perusahaan. Hipotesis bahwa kolaborasi dengan pesaing memiliki hubungan berbentuk U terbalik dengan kinerja inovasi barang diuji menggunakan data pada produk baru dari 749 perusahaan Iran. Hasil menunjukkan bahwa keseimbangan
antara persaingan dan kolaborasi berkontribusi pada kesuksesan inovasi barang. Pengaruh positif
dari kooptasi terlihat konsisten dengan argumentasi bahwa kolaborasi dengan pesaing meningkatkan absorptive capacity, meningkatkan pertukaran informasi dan memfasilitasi penyelesaian
masalah bersama. Hasil juga menunjukkan bahwa kolaborasi yang tidak penting dengan pesaing
dapat berpengaruh negatif terhadap hubungan berbentuk bel antara koopetisi dan kinerja inovasi
barang. Kapabilitas teknologi dan aliansi dengan universitas juga mampu melemahkan hubungan tersebut.

Abstrak

Keywords: co-opetition, kapabilitas teknologi, kolaborasi R&D, inovasi barang, pasar berkembang
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T

o survive competitive environment, firms are increasingly occupied in cooperative alliances
with various partners ranging from
universities (Wu, 2011), suppliers (Nieto and Santamaría, 2007), customers (Belderbos, Carree and Lokshin,
2004), service intermediaries (Pangarkar and Wu, 2012) and government officials (Wu and Chen, 2012) to
competitors (Luo, Rindfleisch and Tse,
2007). Therefore, collaboration with
competitors (so called “co-opetition”)
has attracted increasing research interest over the past decade (Bengtsson,
Eriksson and Wincent, 2010; Gnyawali and Park, 2009, 2011; Ritala, 2012).
While the impacts of co-opetition of
innovation and firm performance seem
quite clear, there are two deficiencies in previous research which limit
our understanding. First, research in
collaboration with competitors has
revived our argument about its positive and negative effects on strategic
behavior and firm performance. While
many researchers support that collaboration with competitors, serious about
the inefficiencies of competition, improves information exchange, reduces
uncertainty and risks and speeds up
new goods development (Gnyawali
and Park, 2011; Ritala and Hurmelinna‐Laukkanen, 2012), others highlight to the downside of the co-opetition such as unplanned knowledge
leakage, management difficulties, and
loss of control (Nieto and Santamaría,
2007; Wu, 2012). But academic studies have previously tended to treat
these two influences separately, rather
than demonstrating both the positive
and negative sides of the co-opetition
(Luo, Rindfleisch and Tse, 2007). Due
to the parallel cooperative and competitive interactions confusion, recent
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researchers have recognized the value
of the tensions arises, and emphasized
that firms in such relationships have a
stimulus to cooperate in the pursuit of
mutual interests and normal benefits
while competing in the pursuit of their
own interests at the price of competitors (Bengtsson, Eriksson and Wincent, 2010; Gnyawali and Park, 2009).
However, there are very few empirical
studies which reflect the dynamic process. Luo, Rindfleisch and Tse (2007)
have stated that the traditional rivalry
view is not well suited to understanding
the complexity of engaging in allied
activities with competitors. Bengtsson,
Eriksson and Wincent (2010) suggested that because of the differences in
focus between paradigms focusing on
cooperative and competitive, respectively, it is difficult to achieve such an
integration within one of these fields.
Moreover, they stated that as there is
a lack of knowledge about the effects
of co-opetition and different types of
interactions, systematic empirical research that goes beyond our conceptual advancements. The present research
is studding these weaknesses by examining the dynamics of collaboration between competing firms in their
R&D activities. Collaborating with
competitors ranges from joint research
and development (R&D) arrangements (Ahuja, 2000), to shared market assets or brand names (Hagedoorn
and Schakenraad, 1994), to shared
manufacturing process (Uzzi, 1997).
This makes the knowledge base of the
competitor firm more appropriate, and
competing partners can improve their
knowledge and skills and improve
their absorptive capacity through the
co-opetition. Meanwhile, the strongest
motive for opportunistic behavior can
lead to information leakage, changes
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in the objectives and core technology for individual gain (Gnyawali and
Park, 2009). The relative difficulty of
achieving a balance in the interactions
makes R&D co-opetition and useful
setting for studying the dynamics that
underlie complex relationships. This
research is studying the twin effects
of R&D co-opetition on firm goods innovation. Goods innovation refers to a
firm’s successful introduction of new
goods, which is a primary way firms
achieve a position of competitive advantage (Wu, 2012). However, a firm
engaged in R&D co-opetitionshould
be positively related with its good innovation performance, but, that any
positive effect would decline collaboration with competitors. This research
also explored the limits of effective
R&D co-opetition arising from firm
capabilities and external linkages.
Moreover, the study tested contradictory hypotheses about the moderating
effects of firm-specific technological
capability and ties with universities or
research institutes.
LITERATURE REVIEW
The Concept of Co-opetition
There are many examples of manufacturing and service industries where
competing firms cooperate in different stages of the value chain. R&D
co-opetition is exemplified by Nokia,
Sony Ericsson, Samsung and other
mobile phone firms joining together
to operate systems in the battle over
whether mobile phone operators will
take the lead on integrating the internet with mobile telephone (Bengtsson, Eriksson, and Wincent, 2010).
The competition and the collaboration
paradigm take account of such complicated relationships. The competition

literature illustrates the neoclassical
and industrial organization theories,
emphasizes the desirable effects of
competition for society and firms, and
suggests that collaboration between
competitors may breed implicit or explicit complicity and thus harm customers (Podolny and Scott Morton,
1999). Collaboration with competitors
is viewed as a market deficiency which
abstructs competitive dynamics and its
resulting benefits. Scholars who studied the cooperative literature, based on
the network and game theories, have
argued that collaboration with competitors improves firm performance
by the negative effects of competition
and improving information exchange
(Uzzi, 1996). But competitive influences on a relationship are usually ignored and the negative influences of
competition are merely mentioned. In
fact, the two different interactions must
co-exist when competitors cooperate
due to their conflicting interests, and
at the same time they must cooperate
due to the interests they have (Das and
Teng, 2000). The concept of co-opetition has been introduced to describe
and analyze such phenomena, as a solution for the weaknesses of the conventional paradigms. Scholars have
conceptualized co-opetition as parallel
collaboration and competition, which
transcends the choices and highlights
the interaction between competition
and collaboration (Bengtsson, Eriksson and Wincent, 2010).
Different Views of Co-opetition
Collaborating with competitors’ displays two different lines of thinking
about dynamic co-opetition. First, the
argument focuses on the environmental interaction in the co-opetition and
argues that the competitive and coop-
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erative relationships and interdependencies in the environment influence
the behavior of individuals, groups or
organizations, determining whether or
not they engage in co-opetition (Lado,
Boyd and Hanlon, 1997). Co-opetitionemerges as a contextual characteristic influencing firms’ competitive
behavior. In this view, two competitors
can cooperate with each other to better compete with a third firm. Research
adopting this perspective has focused
on how individual units and organizations act, or should act, towards their
environment in an co-opetitionsetting.
Therefore, they describe the competitive and cooperative parts of the relationship as divided between the actors;
that is, a firm with a network can have
a cooperative relationship with some
firms in the network and a competitive
relationship with others. An alternative argument describes the co-opetitionas a mutual interaction involving
more entities (Bengtsson, Eriksson
and Wincent, 2010). In an co-opetition
relationship, the expected benefits of
collaboration are predicated on trust,
and the parallel competition suggests
that the benefits of the collaboration
may be constrained by the conflicting
interests of the two parties. Such interactions are on the intra-organizational
and inter-organizational levels (Tsai,
2002), but co-opetition between colleagues competing for promotion is
probably a normal form of all (Hatcher
and Ross, 1991; Smith and Bell, 1992).
The process view of the co-opetition
suggests that the competitive and cooperative parts of an co-opetition relationship are separated among activities
rather than among actors (Bengtsson
and Kock, 1999). The process view
can be further classified into two different approaches based on whether
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the co-opetition should be looked
upon as occurring along one or two
separate continua (Padula and Dagnino, 2007). One continuum ranges from
complete competition to complete collaboration. In between is the possibility of different degrees of co-opetition
relationship. Relationships displaying stronger collaboration will have
more restricted competitive behavior,
and vice versa (Bengtsson and Kock,
2000). But this single continuum approach does not take interactions confused in any co-opetition relationship.
The two-continuum approach suggests
that collaboration and competition are
two different interactions proceeding
in parallel within an co-opetition relationship, and the relationship should
be treated as having two continuums
rather than just one (Bengtsson, Eriksson and Wincent, 2010). Therefore,
two-continuum approach at different
levels of collaboration and competition can co-exist. This two continuum
approach was the point of this study.
The interactions of competitive and
cooperative aspects of co-opetition
should have important implications
for partnering firms’ innovation performance.
Hypotheses
Co-opetition and Goods Innovation
Good innovation, which a firms adapt
and creates a restless environments
and achieve sustainable competitive
advantage (Eisenhardt and Tabrizi,
1995). Among various factors which
identified as an innovation successful, absorptive capacity is a central
one (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990).
Absorptive capacity refers to a firm’s
ability to recognize knowledge which
has value, and apply it to commercial
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ends (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990).
Academic researchers have proposed
technological capability–a firm’s ability to put new technologies to work–as
an important component of absorptive
capacity that plays a critical role in
successful goods innovation (Wu and
Wu, 2013b). However, technological
capability is embedded in organizational routines, making it firm-specific
if separated from the creating firm (Dierickx and Cool, 1989; Prahalad and
Hamel, 1994). A firm can improve its
technological capability by cooperating with competing firms that have
developed their own technological
capabilities. In comparison with noncompeting firms, competing firms have
useful and specific knowledge to possess similar strategic resources, and to
be pursuing normal goals (Gnyawali
and Park, 2009). Improved information exchange is another advantage of
the firm’s cooperating with competitors. As Uzzi (1997) has suggested, information exchange in embedded ties
was more proprietary and tacit than
the price and quantity data. A plenty of
empirical evidence supports the idea
that competitors as innovation partners may get benefits from their normal understanding in terms of greater
value-creation potential. The benefits
of information exchange are especially
great when the partners are competitors, because there is a greater overlap
of interests among competing firms
attempting to apply similar resources
to meet the demands of similar customers (Ingram and Roberts, 2000).
So partnering firms benefit from information transfer, based on which each
can more accurately forecast market changes and adapt to them (Uzzi,
1996, 1997). Collaboration with competitors not only improves technologi-

cal capability and facilitates information exchange; it can also entail joint
problem-solving arrangements. Such
joint problem-solving makes negotiation and mutual adjustment routine,
helping the partners flexibly resolve
problems and improves organizational responses by reducing shortage of
goods and speeding up goods development (Gnyawali and Park, 2009;
Kang and Kang, 2010). Moreover,
such arrangements help firms work
through problems together, receive direct feedback and increase the chance
of discovering new solutions (Uzzi,
1997). Collaboration with competitors
would expect to positively influence a
firm’s goods innovation performance.
However, this positive influence may
decline as collaboration with competitors becomes large. Due to the parallel
existence of a competitive dimension
in an co-opetition relationship, partnering firms still have strong stimulus
to compete in the pursuit of their own
interests at the price of their partner
(Gnyawali and Park, 2011; Ritala and
Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, 2009). Therefore, parties should be quite capable of
understanding each other’s technology
and knowledge, too much collaboration may improve the competitor’s
ability to copy a firm’s technology and
improve its own absorptive capacity
(Ritala and Hurmelinna‐Laukkanen,
2012), making the competitor firm
even more competitive. In addition,
unnecessary inter-organizational collaboration and trust (especially with a
firm’s competitors) may put the firm
at risk and opportune exploitation by
its alliance partners (Selnes and Sallis,
2003). In co-opetition there is always
a high risk of unintended knowledge
spillover, and this is especially serious
in R&D co-opetition (Ritala and Hur-
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melinna; Laukkanen, 2012). As Zeng
and Chen (2003) warn, trusting partner
can become an easy target for exploitation by its greedy partners. Moreover,
firms that are overly cooperative with
their competitors may need to allocate
actual resources to safeguard their investments (Luo, Rindfleisch and Tse,
2007). The actual investment in creating an appropriate co-opetition framework and monitoring systems may increase the rigidity of the collaboration
and decrease its innovation efficiency
(Kang and Kang, 2010; Lhuillery and
Pfister, 2009). Rindfleisch and Moorman (2003) suggest that co-opetitive
partners devote to monitoring hamper
their ability to maintain a strong customer focus. Therefore weak collaboration with competitors can sacrifice
some of the potential benefits of working with competitors and hamper innovation, but unnecessary collaboration
can also be harmful because of the risk
of exploitation opportunity. Therefore
a moderate level collaboration with
competitors appears to be optimal.
H1: Collaboration with competitors
has an inverted U-shaped relationship with a partnering firm’s
goods innovation performance.
The Role of Technological Capability
Firms with strong technological capabilities are able to generate more
value from collaboration with competitors, although permission to information about a partner’s technology
and knowledge base should be useful
(Luo, Rindfleisch and Tse., 2007). Because such capabilities are important
components of absorptive capacity–a
firm’s ability to recognize the value of
new information, incorporate it and apply it to commercial ends–they should
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help a firm understand and learn from
a competitor’s technological expert.
This can be helpful in realizing the
potential of R&D collaboration with
competitors. The firms with strong
technological capabilities can easily
incorporate knowledge from outside
sources, and there are chances that
such knowledge will prove useful in
creating innovative new goods (Ritala
and Hurmelinna‐Laukkanen, 2012).
Moreover, a firm with strong technological capabilities may be more able
to select trusting, capable partners to
help the firm avoid technology leakage
and opportunistic behavior (Gnyawali
and Park, 2009). The innovation benefits of cooperating with a competitor
should therefore improve with a firm’s
strong technological capability.
H2a: Strong technological capability
positively moderates any positive relationship between collaboration with competitors and
good innovation performance.
Capabilities can be built in-house, and
through collaboration with universities and research institutes (Hamel,
1991). Firms choose between different
styles of capability based on the tradeoffs involved. Therefore, cooperating
with competitors is not the only way
in which a firm acquires and develops
goods innovation capabilities. It also
does not change the fact that a firm
and its competitors still remain competitors in the market, in which the
firm with the greater absorptive capacity will tend to be on the winning
side (Hamel, 1991). This leads to a
sort of learning race where each firm
is trying to learn more than it teaches
(Hamel, 1991). If one party has strong
technology, then it does not need to
rely on its competitors to develop
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new goods (Ahuja, 2000), and at the
same time it is interested in revealing
its core technologies to the other party
(Kale, Singh and Perlmutter, 2000).
This is serious when the two parties
are direct competitors. A learning race
stimulates each party with appropriate
knowledge contributed by the others,
but a manager interviewed by Hamel
(1991) explained that, whatever they
learn from us, they will use against us
worldwide. Hence firms with strong
technological capability may have
fewer stimuli to cooperate with competitors in developing new goods. The
disposition to reject new ideas from
outsiders will weaken a firm’s ability
to gain innovation benefits from collaboration with competitors.
H2b: Strong technological capability
negatively moderates any positive relationship between collaboration with competitors and
good innovation performance.
The Role of Research Collaboration
A firm’s innovation benefits of collaboration with its competitors mostly
depend on external linkages. Collaboration with competitors is less
important for firms which already
collaborate with universities or research institutes. Collaboration with
a university or research institute gives
a firm permission to scientific knowledge and complementary assets for its
good innovation with much less risk
of educating its competitors (Belderbos, Carree and Lokshin, 2004; Tether,
2002). Links with universities can also
offer an opportunity to enter into less
direct alliances with other firms while
still gaining exposure to their diverse
management, marketing, managerial, and innovation systems (George,

Zahra and Wood, 2002). Moreover,
collaboration with a university or research institute can help a firm reduce
its R&D expenditure. This is useful for
firms which maintain extensive R&D
facilities. Collaboration with a university or research institute can give
them permission which they need for
new goods development and the expertise of the institution’s personnel
(George, Zahra and Wood, 2002). As
a result, the firm may be able to support more numerous R&D and new
product development projects, and of
course a university or research institute is much less likely to try to appropriate the results of the collaboration.
As Pangarkar and Wu (2012) stated,
alliances with universities pose lower
threats to a partnering firm in terms of
the appropriation of their skills or creating future competitors, and successfully reduces the high risk related to
alliances with competitors. As the university or institute is the source of the
knowledge and innovation, this gives
firms and stimulus to collaborate with
a university or research institute rather
than a competitor in goods innovation
wherever possible. The value of collaboration with competitors in goods
innovation declines accordingly.
H3a: Research collaboration with universities and research institutes
negatively moderates any positive relationship between collaboration with competitors and
good innovation performance.
According to Jiang, Tao and Santoro, (2010), also Pangarkar and Wu,
(2012), research collaboration with
universities and research institutes
may bring a firm a non-redundant inflow of resources. Pangarkar and Wu
(2012) showed that alliances with uni-
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versities can benefit a firm in several
different ways, including legitimacy,
source of knowledge in the basic sciences, and links with local businesses
which might open up possibilities for
further collaboration. Similarly, Jiang,
Tao and Santoro, (2010) stated that
partnering with organizations outside
the industry can improve value chain
coordination. Stuart (2000) suggests
that firms innovate more and grow
faster when their alliance partner is
larger. Based on that logic, collaboration with universities and research
institutes may generate beneficial synergies which could strengthen the linkage between an co-opetition and innovation performance.
H3b: Research collaboration with universities and research institutes
positively moderates any positive relationship between collaboration with competitors and
good innovation performance.
RESEARCH METHOD
Data and Sampling
The empirical analyses employed
data of this study were gathered via a
mailed survey. The survey covered a
wide range of industries including five
manufacturing sectors (i.e. electronic
equipments, electronic components,
consumer goods, vehicles and vehicle parts, apparels, and leather goods),
five service sectors (i.e. accounting,
advertising and marketing, business
logistics, communications, and information technology), and Iranian firms
with more than 8 employees. These
firms were randomly selected from
five provinces (Azerbaijan, Kermanshah, Qazvin, Elam, and Hamadan).
The information regarding firm age,
number of employees, sales and goods
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innovation in 2012 were gathered
from archival sources and compared
with the information from the sampled
firms. The data were therefore taken
as correctly describing each firm’s
R&D collaboration with its competitors, and this information was used to
test the proposed relationships. Prior
to the questionnaire design, a pilot
test was designed as semi-structured
through 34 random exploratory interviews conducted with executive’s
business managers. The completed
questionnaires were sent to a research
team that went through every question
to determine whether these managers had understood the questions correctly. Based on their feedback, some
final processing of the questionnaire
was made to improve the accuracy of
the questions. A letter of introduction
was hand delivered to top executives
(the CEOs or general managers) of
each company, explaining the purpose
of the study and inviting participation
and guaranteeing confidentiality of the
information provided. These top executives were contacted by a telephone
call within four weeks. They were
reminded of the survey and invited
to participate in the study. To minimize problems about normal method
bias, the survey was designed as two
separate questionnaires that were answered by two different groups of respondents from the same company.
Accountants or personnel managers
were asked to complete the first part.
They provided basic profile information such as firm age, external ties, and
labor force size. The general manager
was asked to complete the second part.
They provided the information on innovation outcomes and other matters.
The study employed information on
the dependent and independent vari-
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Table 1. Key Success Factors in HADR Missions: Summary of Literature Review
Correlation matrix
Variables
New goods
Co-opetition
Technological capability
Research collaboration
Firm age
Firm size

Mean
1.00
0.03
0.23
0.42
15.55
0.15

S.D.
4.05
0.05
0.42
1.25
15.05
0.35

1
1.00
0.23*
0.03*
0.15*
0.04
0.07*

2
1.00
0.03
0.42*
−0.03
0.06*

3

1.00
0.14*
0.03
0.24*

4

1.00
0.06*
0.22*

5

1.00
0.23*

6

1.00

* indicates significance at the p ≤ 0.05 level of confidence.

ables provided by two different respondents from each firm answering
at different times. This decreased the
risk of normal method bias. After deleting incomplete questionnaires, the
final sample comprised of 749 firms
(including accounting and related services sectors, advertising and marketing, apparel and leather goods, business logistics services, communication
services, consumer goods, electronic
components, electronic equipment,
information technology services, vehicle and vehicle parts industries). Of
the 749 firms, 41 % were of medium
size with employees between 50 and
250 people and 48.09% were smaller
with less than 50 employees. About
42% had been in business between
5 and 10 years, with another 25.50%
aged between 10 and 30 years, 15.59%
were older and 17.68% were aged less
than 5 years. This study used several
statistical techniques to evaluate heteroscedasticity (whether or not pooling data across industries and cities
was appropriate). First, we followed
Bowen and Wiersema’s (1999) approach to analyze the panel data using
White’s generalized test. The result of
Breusch–Pagan test statistics revealed
no heteroscedasticity concerns (χ2 =
14.99, p = 0.33). Second, we followed
Wooldridge’s (2009) acclaim to plot
the estimated residuals against the
independent variables. There was no
evidence of systematic patterns of het-

eroscedasticity in the data. In addition,
we created “dummy” variables representing industries and cities to model
coefficient variation, as this statistical
technique is suggested to effectively
reduce the concern about possible heteroscedasticity related with pooling of
the data (Greene, 1993).
Measures
Goods Innovation
We measured a firm’s goods innovation by the number of new goods. Prior studies have shown that the number
of new goods successfully introduced
to the market is an important indicator of goods innovation (Katila, 2002).
Chaney and Devinney (1992) showed
that the introduction of new goods increases market share and market value,
and Roberts (1999) found that successful new goods introductions increased
a firm’s performance. Banbury and
Mitchell (1995) also suggested that a
firm that successfully introduced new
goods increased its survival chances.
Dynamic Co-opetition
Quantifying co-opetition requires information about whether a firm engages in parallel competition and collaboration in an alliance, and the length of
collaboration in the alliance. Among
the competitors identified, they were
asked to indicate whether their firm cooperated with any of them in R&D. A
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dummy variable co-opetition was then
coded 1, or 0 otherwise. Extensive
studies have suggested that a firm’s
disposition to develop its new goods
through collaboration with competitors is determined by the competitive
intensity (Ritala, 2012; Wu, 2012).
The length of collaboration a firm allocates to in an co-opetition relationship was therefore measured as:
P(y=1I×) = G(α+β1 competitive
		+β2 experience
		+
)

1)

Here y is a dichotomous variable reflecting a firm’s disposition in developing new goods (1 = co-development
with competitors; 0 = in-house development); competitive represents the
intensity of the competition a firm encounters which was measured by the
ratio of increased new competitors
among all the competitors the focal
firm encountered (Wu, 2012); experience represents a firm’s co-opetition
experience, which was measured by
the number of years that a firm formed
an R&D cooperative relationship with
competitors in the past (Ahuja, 2000);
and industry is an industry dummy. G
is a logistic function:
G(Z)=exp(z)/[1+exp(z)]=Δ(z)

2)

Which takes on values between zero
and one for all real z. This is the cumulative distribution function for
a standard logistic random variable
(Wooldridge, 2009). Equation (1) reflects the length to which the firm cooperates with its competitors in R&D
activities, after controlling industry
heterogeneity. A high value indicates
that a firm is likely to cooperate with
its competitors, whereas a low value
indicates that is unlikely (Oczkowski,
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2002). Previous studies about strong
technological capability (Wu and Wu,
2013a) have used R&D intensity as a
measure of a firm’s technological capability, and this study followed that
lead by using the ratio of R&D spending to total sales, designated Vj. For
each firm (j), a dummy variable TKj
was created which took the value 1 if
Vj exceeded the average for the firm’s
city and industry and 0 otherwise. In
prior studies about research collaboration (George, Zahra and Wood, 2002;
Wu, 2011), research collaboration was
quantified using the information provided by the respondents about whether or not their firms had a contractual
or informal R&D relationship with a
university and/or a research institute.
A dichotomous variable was coded 1
if a firm reported R&D collaborating
with a university or research institute
during the period and 0 otherwise.
As large firms have more resources to
allocate goods innovation (Eisenhardt
and Tabrizi, 1995), the study controlled
for firm size using the logarithm of the
number of employees. Prior studies
have provided about the effect of firm
age on innovation performance (Sorensen and Stuart, 2000), so the logarithm of firm age was included in the
analyses. In addition, because the sample included firms from ten industries,
nine industries dummy variables were
created using the accounting service
industry as the base group. Four city
dummy variables were also included
to control for location effects with
Qazvin province as the base group in
the analysis.
Statistical Modelling
The dependent variable (number of
new goods) ranges from zero to a

The South East Asian Journal of Management • Vol. 9 • No. 2 • 2015 • 87-107

Table 2. Regression Analysis for Successful New Product Introductions
Variables
Constant
Firm age
Firm size
Advertising and
marketing
Apparel and
leather goods
Communication
services
Consumer
goods
Electronic
components
Electronic
equipment
Information
technology
services
Vehicles and
vehicle parts
Qazvin
West Azerbaijan
East Azerbaijan
kurdistan

M1
−0.12
(0.33)
0.00
(0.01)
0.96***
(0.26)
−0.06
(0.48)
−0.28
(0.48)
−0.34
(0.47)
−0.24
(0.41)
−0.37
(0.41)
−0.35
(0.37)
0.06
(0.38)

M2
−0.4
(0.33)
0.01
(0.01)
0.621*
(0.28)
−0.12
(0.48)
−0.23
(0.53)
−0.75
(0.38)
−0.48
(0.38)
−0.37
(0.42)
−0.43
(0.38)
−0.03
(0.42)

M3
−0.63
(0.32)
0.01
(0.01)
0.63*
(0.31)
−0.23
(0.46)
−0.19
(0.53)
−0.79*
(0.38)
−0.46
(0.37)
−0.37
(0.41)
−0.52
(0.37)
−0.11
(0.42)

M4
−0.72*
(0.34)
0.01
(0.01)
0.34
(0.27)
−0.37
(0.45)
−0.22
(0.52)
−0.73
(0.41)
−0.52
(0.37)
−0.48
(0.43)
−0.58
(0.37)
−0.17
(0.43)

M5
−0.72*
(0.34)
0.01
(0.01)
0.34
(0.26)
−0.52
(0.45)
−0.18
(0.53)
−0.84*
(0.41)
−0.52
(0.36)
−0.45
(0.42)
−0.66
(0.36)
−0.22
(0.43)

M6
−0.72*
(0.34)
0.01
(0.01)
0.34
(0.27)
−0.38
(0.45)
−0.18
(0.54)
−0.78
(0.42)
−0.51
(0.37)
−0.49
(0.42)
−0.58
(0.37)
−0.17
(0.43)

M7
−0.75*
(0.35)
0.01
(0.01)
0.33
(0.26)
−0.47
(0.45)
−0.19
(0.52)
−0.86
(0.41)
−0.51
(0.39)
−0.44
(0.40)
−0.65
(0.38)
−0.22
(0.43)

−0.58
(0.37)
0.07
(0.25)
−0.01
(0.24)
−0.03
(0.28)
−0.19
(0.33)

−0.687
(0.37)
−0.08
(0.25)
0.06
(0.24)
−0.05
(0.29)
−0.22
(0.34)
12.23***
(2.08)

−0.56
(0.36)
−0.12
(0.25)
0.11
(0.25)
−0.00
(0.29)
−0.12
(0.34)
25.86***
(4.57)
−59.62***
(12.35)

−0.76
(0.38)
−0.02
(0.25)
0.18
(0.24)
−0.15
(0.29)
0.04
(0.35)
25.83***
(4.55)
−51.67***
(12.57)
0.36*
(0.18)
0.18**
(0.06)

−0.77*
(0.37)
−0.06
(0.25)
0.18
(0.24)
−0.14
(0.29)
0.03
(0.35)
28.09***
(4.78)
−77.18***
(14.74)
0.34*
(0.18)
0.19**
(0.06)
−21.85***
(4.68)

−0.75
(0.38)
0.02
(0.25)
0.22
(0.24)
0.16
(0.29)
0.03
(0.35)
24.34***
(4.54)
−43.89***
(12.14)
0.35*
(0.18)
0.23**
(0.08)

−0.76*
(0.39)
−0.04
(0.25)
0.23
(0.24)
0.16
(0.29)
0.02
(0.35)
27.95***
(4.99)
−68.95***
(13.96)
0.35*
(0.18)
0.18**
(0.08)
−23.48***
(4.53)

−0.77*
(0.36)

−0.84*
(0.36)

−16234.52
3288.06
3410.22
22
112.79
0.000

−1618.39
3267.89
3405.23
23
114.31
0.000

Co-opetition
Co-opetition2
Technological
capability
Research
collaboration
Co-opetition×
Technological
capability
Co-opetition×
Research
collaboration
Log-likelihood
AIC
BIC
d.f.
χ2
Prob. > χ2

−1674.15
3345.36
3479.93
15
31.96
0.000

−1656.98
3367.89
3432.78
16
65.17
0.000

−1626.12
3345.39
3422.60
17
105.93
0.000

−1646.49
3327.98
3421.82
21
105.69
0.000

−1641.62
3294.89
3414.64
22
120.99
0.000

Note. N = 749. Robust standard errors are given in parentheses
M 1 includes the controls, M 2 adds the main effect of co-opetition, and M3 includes its squared term. M 4
include the effects of technological capability and collaboration with universities or research institutes (research
collaboration), 5 includes the interaction of co-opetition with technological capability, M 6 includes the
interaction term of co-opetition with research collaboration, and finally M 7 is the full model including all the
variables.
* significance at the p ≤ 0.05 (**p ≤ 0.01; ***p ≤ 0.001) level of confidence (one-tailed tests for hypothesized
variables, two-tailed tests for controls).
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positive value. Such a non-negative
dependent variable violates the assumptions underlying linear regression techniques. Therefore negative
binomial or Poisson regression models are adopted to deal with such variables. The large variance in the number of new goods that the firms have
introduced makes a negative binomial
regression model (NBRM) preferable
to a Poisson regression model (PRM),
which requires that the mean to be
equal to the standard deviation (Hausman, Hall and Griliches, 1984). However, a NBRM assumes that all zero
counts, as well as positive counts, are
generated by the same negative binomial process. This assumption would
be unrealistic, because some zero
counts may be a function of the firms’
characteristics and not governed by the
same process at all. We thereby employed zero-inflated negative binomial
(ZINB) regression models in the data
analysis. We used the number of new
goods the firm introduced in the prior
year to estimate the zero counts, taking into consideration a possible delay
before the effects of co-opetition, technological capability, and research collaboration would be reflected in goods
innovation performance.
RESULT AND DISCUSSION
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analyses. A study of the correlations among
the independent variables suggests
that multicollinearity was not a major
concern. This is confirmed by the analysis of variance of inflation (VIF). The
VIF values ranged from 1.32 to 3.03,
well below the cutoff threshold of
nine, which indicates that there were
no serious multicollinearity problems
in the models (Hair, Anderson, Tatham
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and Black, 1998). Table 2 provides the
estimation results testing the hypotheses (M1 includes the controls, M2
the main effect of co-opetition, M4 research collaboration). To reduce multicollinearity problems, the moderator
variables were mean-centered before
creating the interaction terms (Aiken
and West, 1991). Chi-squares for these
models indicate significant explanatory power and the smaller values of the
Akaike information criterion (AIC)
and the Bayesian information criterion
(BIC) in models 2–7 compared with
each previous model suggest that the
relative goodness of fit in each model
improved significantly compared to
the previous ones.
Hypothesis 1 deals with the relationship between co-opetition and good
innovation performance. The coefficients of co-opetition in M3 (includes
its squared term) and M7 (the full
model, including all the variables) is
positive and significant (β = 26.87, p ≤
0.001 in M3; β = 27. 95, p ≤ 0.001 in
M7), and the coefficients of (co-opetition) 2 are negative and significant (β
= −59.62, p ≤ 0.001 in M3; β = −68.
95, p ≤ 0.001 in M7). Therefore, these
results support Hypothesis 1; and
there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between co-opetition and good
innovation performance. Hypotheses
2a and 2b evaluate the moderating effect of firm’s technological capability. As M5 (includes the interaction of
co-opetition with technological capability) and M7 show, the coefficients
of the interaction of co-opetitionwith
technological capability are negative and significant (β = −21. 85, p ≤
0.001 in M5; β = −23. 82, p ≤ 0.001
in M7), indicating that strong technological capability weakens the positive
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Figure 1. The Impacts of Co-opetition and Technological Capability on Goods
Innovation
relationship between co-opetition and
good innovation performance.
Figure 1 shows the interpretation effect by using a method from Aiken and
West (1991) for the interaction model.
In Figure 1 the horizontal axis represents the length of collaboration a firm
allocates in its co-opetition with competitors in R&D and the vertical axis
represents the number of new goods
successfully introduced. The firms
were broken into two groups: low
(where the technological capability
takes the value of 0) and high (where
it takes the value of 1). This figure
shows that the degree of collaboration
with competitors has an inverted Ushaped relationship with the number
of new goods successfully introduced.
Strong technological capability eliminates the inverted U-shaped effect of
collaboration with competitors on
the number of new goods introduced.
Therefore, hypothesis 2a was rejected
and hypothesis 2b was supported. This
could reflect the fact that Iranian firms
with strong technology have emerged

as a local competitor in domestic markets. They are therefore less likely to
benefit from cooperating with small
local players struggled with weak
technological capability. Small local
players with weak technology find it
difficult to partner with technologically stronger firms because they have
little to offer.
Hypothesis 3a predicts that the positive relationship between co-opetition
and good innovation performance is
negatively moderated with a university or research institute collaboration,
whereas hypothesis 3b predicts a positive moderation. The coefficients of
the interaction term for co-opetition
and research collaboration are negative and significant in M6 (includes
the interaction term of co-opetition
with research collaboration) and M7
(β = −0. 77, p ≤ 0. 05 in M6; β = −0.
84, p ≤ 0. 05 in M7), showing that
collaboration with a university or research institute weakens the positive
relationship between co-opetition and
good innovation. Figure 2 shows the
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Figure 2. The Impacts of co-opetition and Research Collaboration on Goods
Innovation
interpretation effect following the
procedure discussed above. The firms
were again broken into two groups,
those without such alliances (where
research collaboration takes the value
of 0) and those with alliances (where
research collaboration takes the value
of 1). This figure again shows that the
degree of collaboration with competitors has an inverted U-shaped relationship with the number of new goods.
The inverted U-shaped relationship
between collaboration with competitors and the number of new goods introduced is stronger for firms without
an alliance with a university than for
those with alliances. These results support hypothesis 3a, whereas hypothesis 3b was rejected. This could be explained by the imperfect status of the
firm–university collaborations in Iran.
To reduce any concerns that the sample contained observations without
any new goods, a limited sub-sample
constructed was to firms reporting at
least one new goods, and the models
were then re-estimated with that sub-
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sample of 432 firms. The results did
not change. Another concern could
be that while this study used the coopetition as a predictor variable, all
the firms did not have the same chance
of cooperating with their competitors.
Firms which reported collaboration
may be systematically different from
those reporting. To reduce this concern, a method was employed to correct this endogeneity problem (Hamilton and Nickerson, 2003). The analysis
proceeded in two stages. In the first
stage, probit regression was used to estimate the firm engagement in the coopetition as a function of firm age, and
the firm’s innovation performance in
the previous year. The predicted value
derived from the first stage was transformed into an inverse Mills ratio2 (λ),
which was then included as a regressor
in the second stage model to estimate
the new best innovation (Hamilton and
Nickerson, 2003). The results generated from this two-stage procedure
remained consistent with the earlier
findings. In addition, manufacturing
and service industries may exhibit dif-
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ferent innovation patterns (Sirilli and
Evangelista, 1998), so an additional
robustness test was conducted to explicitly take this into consideration.
The sample was divided into manufacturing and service sub-samples and all
the models were re-estimated for each
subgroup. There was again no significant difference in terms of the main effect of co-opetition and its interaction
with technological capability and research collaboration, providing further
evidence of their robustness.
CONCLUSION
This study hypothesized and empirically showed that collaboration with
competitors has an inverted U-shaped
relationship with successful goods innovation. Strong technological capability and collaboration with universities or research institutes negatively
moderates the relationship between
co-opetition and goods innovation
success. These results have several
important implications. The tension
has previously been assumed, but the
resulting dynamics have important implications for South East Asian firms
regarding firm innovation and performance, which have not been validated
before. This study has filled in some of
the gaps and more clearly related the
dynamics of co-opetition to innovation
performance. The inverted U-shaped
relationship demonstrated in this study
gives new concreteness to the role of
the tensions in influencing firm performance.
This study has addressed two weaknesses in the previous research on
co-opetition. First, the tensions arising from parallel collaboration and
competition have implications for firm
innovation and performance. Second,

the limited evidence documented the
twin effects of co-opetition on innovation outcomes. The results provide a
shad on the balance between competition and collaboration by confirming that collaboration with competitors contributes to successful goods
innovation, but also showing its dark
side. The positive influences of coopetition are consistent with the cooperative arguments, that collaboration
with competitors increases absorptive capacity, improves information
exchange, and facilitates joint problem solving. However the results also
show that unnecessary collaboration
with competitors can have a negative
influence on innovation performance,
supporting opportunistic exploitation.
The positive and negative influences
of co-opetition highlight the need to
balance competition and collaboration
to optimize innovation returns. This
study theoretically explained and empirically demonstrated the moderating
effect of firm-specific technological
capability on the relationship between
collaboration with competitors and innovation performance. This study tested the contradictory hypotheses about
the moderating effects of firm specific
technological capability and alliances
with universities, which have previously been less explored. The positive
effect co-opetition has on goods innovation is negatively moderated by
strong technological capability and
alliances with universities. This finding advances the context-dependent
view of co-opetition. This study complements such findings by emphasizing the substantive effects of different
external linkages in firm goods innovation. This study acknowledged that
firms are embedded in complex, multiple social ties, and the results confirm
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that it is important to examine how
different social ties interact to predict
performance differences. When trading off the risks and benefits of various types of social ties, firms can use
one type of social tie to substitute for
another.
The findings of this study suggest that
managers need to pay more attention
to how collaboration with competitors
can contribute to the success of their
firms’ goods innovation. Managers
thus should realize that collaboration
with competitors cannot be unimportant as a moderator in the mechanisms
governing business exchanges. They
should also revise their logic of competition accordingly by incorporating
the logic of collaboration. Managers
are encouraged to consider the potential benefits of not only competing
with their competitors but also building alliances with them. However, in
South East Asian firms, collaboration
with competitors needs to be carefully
considered because an over-reliance
on collaboration in R&D may be just
as harmful as endorsing that strategy.
Unnecessary collaboration may lead
to opportunistic exploitation, and increased rigidity and inefficiency in
the innovation process. Therefore, it
is critical for a firm to what might be
termed an co-opetition capability - a
balance between collaboration and
competition. The results also show
that firms should still aim to develop
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